ACTUS REUS
Mens rea, Actus reus
Actus reus is one of two components of a crime, the other
being mens rea. Actus reus refers to the physical component of
a crime, the act of committing the crime (physical act of taking something from someone's
house).
Mens rea, in contrast, is the mental component of crime,
the existence of a criminal intent, and this requires the offender to have intended to
carry out the physical act.
Both components are required for conviction under
criminal law although for some other laws, called laws of absolute liability, only the
physical component is required.
Many criminal lawyers, judges, and professors see the
distinction between actus reus and mens rea as one of the more basic of criminal law.
Along with the offense-defense distinction, it helps us organize the way we conceptualize
and analyze liability. It is said to be the corner-stone of discussion on the nature of
criminal liability. The concepts of actus reus and mens rea have justified themselves by
their usefulness.
This most basic organizing distinction is not coherent. Rather than being useful to
criminal law theory, it is harmful because it creates ambiguity in discourse and hides
important doctrinal differences of which criminal law should take account. I suggest that
we abandon the distinction in favor of other conceptualizations. - Should the
Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction? - PAUL H. ROBINSON,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Philosophical Analysis and the Criminal Law
L.A. ZAIBERT, University of Wisconsin - Parkside - Department of Philosophy
Abstract: An important aspect of philosophical analysis is the method of identifying the
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be what it is. This method can
be very fruitful for the understanding of the criminal law and for the drafting and reform
of criminal codes. Though this method is sometimes used regarding specific Anglo-American
criminal law concepts, it is not used enough. Continental legal systems apply this method
in a more decisive manner, and in particular, they apply this method to the very notion of
?crime?. Identifying the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an event to be a
crime sheds considerable light on the nature of this concept as well as on the purposes of
criminal legislation.
The application of this method reveals important
conception, political, and ethical distinctions between different aspects of the concept
of a crime. It reveals, too, inadequacies with well-known and allegedly foundational
distinctions in Anglo-American law, such as the actus reus/mens rea distinction, the
objective/subjective distinction, the act requirement/actus reus requirement distinction,
the justification/excuse distinction and others. I shall show that while the conceptual
scheme of continental criminal law shares some of the infelicities of the Anglo-American
criminal law, it nonetheless has some analytical advantages.
I shall focus on one problem whose treatment is similarly inadequate in both traditions:
the distinction between acts and thoughts. And I shall argue that making this distinction
is valuable, insofar as it is a way of bringing intelligibility and organization to the
criminal law in general and to criminal codes in particular. Sadly, this distinction does
not gain in intelligibility by appealing to the actus reus/mens rea distinction, or to the
act requirement/mens rea distinction, or to the action/culpability distinction of
continental criminal law. In order to make a sensible distinction between acts and
thoughts, it is necessary to abandon theories that define acts in terms of thoughts. The
Model Penal Code, as many codes in Europe and Latin America, defines acts in terms of
thoughts, and thus they render any attempt to sharply distinguish one of these phenomena
from the other hopelessly confused. I conclude here by attempting to show the problems of
the volitional theory of action, the Model Penal Code?s underlying theory of action, and
by suggesting alternative ways of defining human acts. -
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=191191
Assault, Rape, Bigamy, and Related Offenses; Mens Rea and
Actus Reus (From Criminal Law and Approaches to the Study of Law: Cases and Materials,
Second Edition, P 107-228, 1991, John M Brumbaugh -- See NCJ-129382)
J M Brumbaugh - Founation Press
Discusses the theoretical anatomy of a criminal offense -- the elements of mens rea and
actus reus -- and uses such crimes as assault and rape to illustrate both the particular
crimes and the theoretical models.
Abstract: The chapter first examines the crime of assault, considering what it requires,
both as to the conduct and the state of mind of the accused. Victim consent is then
examined as one factor that may be a justifying defense to an assault charge (e.g., a
football injury or medical treatment). The chapter then moves to a more detailed analysis
of mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus (guilty act). The actus reus differs with each
crime according to the nature of the definition of the offense. The mens rea concerns the
wrongful attitude of the accused that accompanies the actus reus of the offense. The
discussion of actus reus encompasses omissions and voluntary conduct. A discussion of the
concurrence of actus reus and mens rea is followed by consideration of absolute liability
offenses, i.e., offenses that do not require proof of criminal intent. The chapter
concludes with an examination of the relationship between mens rea and the accused's
ignorance of or mistaken belief about the facts or the law, using the law of rape, bigamy,
and related offenses to illustrate this concept. Court cases and particular statutes are
used to illustrate the concepts presented. -
ncjrs.gov/app/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=129383
Recent Developments in the English Law of Involuntary Manslaughter
C Elliott - Journal: European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Volume:3
Issue:3 Dated:(1995) Pages:272-280
Discusses the recent changes in the law of involuntary manslaughter in England.
Abstract: Involuntary manslaughter occurs when the defendant has the actus reus (acts and
circumstances that have to be proved for the offense to have been committed) of murder but
lacks the mens rea (requisite mental state) of murder, but it can be proved that the
accused had some lesser form of mens rea related to the victim's death. Prior to the
summer of 1993 it was generally accepted that there were two forms of involuntary
manslaughter: constructive manslaughter and Caldwell reckless manslaughter. Constructive
manslaughter occurs when the accused has the actus reus of murder and causes the death of
the victim while perpetrating another crime. The relevant mens rea for this type of
manslaughter is the mens rea for the lesser offense that led to the death. Caldwell
reckless manslaughter occurs when the accused has the actus reus of murder and has the
mens rea to either see the risk to the victim or where the risk is obvious but the accused
gives no thought to it. These two forms of involuntary manslaughter must be reconsidered
in the context of the House of Lords decision in R v. Adomako, which approved the Court of
Appeal's judgment in the case of R v. Prentice. In these decisions the Caldwell reckless
manslaughter does not exist; instead there is gross negligence manslaughter; in order for
liability for gross negligence to occur, there must be the actus reus of murder, a risk of
death, a duty of care, and a grossly negligent breach of that duty. This article considers
first the concept of a "duty," as the author argues that its meaning can only be
found by considering the concept in the civil law of negligence. Secondly, the element of
"gross negligence" is also examined, and it is shown that this is not a purely
objective criteria but can also include subjective states of mind, and that the failure to
define gross negligence makes it potentially much wider than Caldwell recklessness. The
issue of subjective reckless manslaughter is considered, and it is suggested that no such
form of involuntary manslaughter currently exists. Consideration is given to reform
proposals, and the author argues that constructive manslaughter and gross negligence
manslaughter should both be abolished and replaced by subjective reckless manslaughter. -
ncjrs.gov/app/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=163037
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