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Consequentialism

Sociologyindex, Egalitarianism, Utilitarianism, Consequentialism, Sociology Books 2012

"The ends justify the means"
The term "consequentialism" was coined by G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, to describe what she saw as the central error of certain moral theories, such as those propounded by Mill and Sidgwick.

The term consequentialism refers to moral theories which hold that the consequences of a particular action form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action. A consequentialist believes a morally right action is one that produces a good outcome, or consequence. Hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory.

Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism may only require that we avoid bad ones.

Consequentialism defers from deontology. Rule consequentialism is a theory that is sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile deontology and consequentialism. Rule consequentialism also exists in the forms of rule utilitarianism and rule egoism.

Consequentialists committed to an altruistic account of consequentialism employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. Consequentialist theories thus hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.

The defining feature of consequentialist moral theories is the weight given to the consequences in evaluating the rightness and wrongness of actions. - Mackie, J. L. (1990). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin.

"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think..." - Jeremy Bentham , The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).

Consequentialism and Non-Consequentialism: The Axiomatic Approach
Kotaro Suzumura, Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research; Osaka University
Yongsheng Xu, Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-11
Abstract: Most, if not at all, practitioners of welfare economics and social choice theory are presumed to be welfaristic in their conviction. Indeed, they evaluate the goodness of an economic policy and/or economic system in terms of the welfare that people receive at the culmination outcomes thereby generated. Recent years have witnessed a substantial upsurge of interest in the non-welfaristic bases, or even the non-consequentialist bases, of welfare economics and social choice theory. Capitalizing on the axiomatic approach which we explored in the recent past, we try to provide a coherent analysis of consequentialism vis-a-vis non-consequentialism. To begin with, we develop an abstract framework in which the primitive of our analysis is a preference ordering held by an evaluator over the pairs of culmination outcomes and opportunity sets from which those culmination outcomes are chosen. As a partial test to see how much relevance can be claimed of the axiomatized concepts of consequentialism and non-consequentialism, two simple applications of this abstract framework are worked out. The first application is to the Arrovian social choice theory and the second application is to the analysis of ultimatum games.

Kantian Consequentialism
Cummiskey, David, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bates College
Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-509453-4 doi:10.1093/0195094530.001.0001
Abstract: Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent-centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end-in-itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.

Pragmatism and Consequentialism
Philip X. Wang, Columbia University - Law School
Abstract: Legal Pragmatism is the view that judges should decide cases in a way that is, all things considered, in the best interests of the community. It is a forward-looking theory that rejects inviolable constraints by past judicial decisions. A pragmatist judge believes that the future should not be the slave of the past. In this paper, I argue that pragmatism is an attractive view because it is an idealized form of consequentialism: pragmatism captures the most desirable features of consequentialism while avoiding consequentialism's most powerful objections. I will also argue that rule pragmatism -- a version of pragmatism that is able to respect legal rules, just as rule consequentialism is able to respect moral rules -- is a viable theory of adjudication that is consistent with traditional legal values and the rule of law.

A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict
Jonas Olsona and Frans Svenssona, Uppsala University, jonas.olson@filosofi.uu.se, frans.svensson@filosofi.uu.se
Utilitas (2003), 15:194-205 Cambridge University Press 2003 doi:10.1017/S0953820800003940
Abstract: Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We end by suggesting that our proposed position appears quite appealing since it preserves attractive elements from particularism as well as consequentialism.

Consequentialism and the Problem of Untethered Theory (With Special Reference to Employment Arbitration Abolitionists)
Turner, Ronald
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society
Abstract: The paper will examine published calls for and proposals to outlaw employment arbitration and will ask whether and how such a prohibition would work to the advantage or detriment of workers. My take is that abolishing employment arbitration could deprive (too) many workers of their only realistic chance to present challenges to adverse employment actions to an adjudicator who is empowered to overrule and remedy an employer's discharge, discipline, refusal to promote, etc. Some abolitionists have argued that forbidding arbitration promotes the rule of law and the role of the courts in developing employment discrimination law and policy. I want to interrogate that position and suggest, first, that the theoretical "rule of law" is not always normatively desirable, depending on who you are, a particular rule of law is something to be respected and obeyed or reviled and avoided. The promotion of an abstract notion of the rule of law does not tell us anything about the specifics and realities of the pertinent legal regime and does not tell us whether and how workers as a class may or will be better off if the courts are the only available dispute resolution forum for their claims. As for the argument that forbidding arbitration will protect and promote the role of courts in developing employment law and policy, I have been struck by the absence of discussion of, and will address and grapple with the fact that, courts have interpreted and applied laws in ways that are not employee-friendly or employee-protective.

Freedom and Binding Consequentialism
David Braddon-Mitchell
Abstract: The paper proposes a new version of direct act consequentialism that will provide the same evaluations of the rightness of acts as indirect disposition, motive or character consequentialism, thus reconciling the coherence of direct consequentialism with the plausible results in cases of indirect consequentialism. This is achieved by seeing that adopting certain kinds of moral dispositions causally constrains our future acts, so that the maximizing acts ruled out by the disposition can no longer be chosen. Thus when we act we do the best we can, which is all that is required for rightness according to act consequentialism.

Consequentialism, Demandingness and Moral Obligation
Brian McElwee, University of St Andrews (10 Mar 2004)
First SPPA Seminar Day, University of Edinburgh
Perhaps the main objection to consequentialism is what has come to be known as the demandingness objection. In this paper I discuss how the consequentialist should respond to this objection, firstly by considering and rejecting two prima facie attractive responses, from Michael Slote and Bjorn Eriksson. In showing how these responses are unsatisfactory, I outline what I take to be the most plausible form of consequentialism, one which does not fall foul of the demandingness objection. This form of consequentialism denies the deeply unintuitive claim that we have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. The consequentialist must instead reject as fundamental the traditional deontological categories- 'right', 'wrong' and 'obligation'. Consequentialism should not be understood primarily as a theory of morality narrowly conceived as focusing on obligation, but instead as a theory of the goodness and choiceworthiness of actions and practices, and of what we have most reason to do.
Take the following claim:
Moral Consequentialism (MC): We have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. The right action is that which brings about the best consequences. All other actions are wrong.
Accepting MC leads to some deeply counter-intuitive results. For example, someone who gives up most of his time and money for the good of others, strives copiously to bring about large amounts of good, but does less than the very most he can, has, according to MC, failed in his obligations and is acting morally wrongly. This seems totally detached from our common sense moral thought.
I argue however that there are positions which are recognisably consequentialist, but which do not fall foul of this objection. Consider, for example, the following position:
General Consequentialism (GC): The best thing we can do is bring about the best consequences we can. What we have most reason to do is bring about the best consequences we can.
Now such a consequentialism has, as yet, made no demands whatsoever, and so does not, or at least not obviously, demand too much. I argue that consequentialists should defend GC, but reject MC.
A consequentialism which demands the best available consequences is counter-intuitive because of the conceptual link between moral demands and blameworthiness. In response to the demandingness objection, Michael Slote proposes a position which he calls 'satisficing consequentialism', which identifies right action or permissible action as that which brings about good enough consequences. In showing how Slote's account fails, I highlight the importance of taking account of the notions of effort, cost and sacrifice in considering whether we have met the demands of morality.
Given this importance, one might think it open to the consequentialist to work these notions directly in to an account of moral rightness and obligation, simply as a second set of relevant factors alongside consequences themselves. I argue that such a project is misconceived, by examining one such attempt by Bjorn Eriksson. I point out particular problems with Eriksson's account, before going on to emphasise structural problems which face any such account, and suggest that considerations relevant to objective choiceworthiness (i.e. consequences) must be kept firmly apart from those relevant to judging blameworthiness (e.g. effort, difficulty, cost, sacrifice). I conclude that the consequentialist seems committed to rejecting as fundamental the traditional deontological framework of right, wrong and obligation.

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