CORPORATE CRIME

Sociologyindex, Sociology Books 2012, Organized Crime, White-Collar Crime, Blue-collar crime, Pink-collar Crime, Political Crime, Corporate crime

Corporate crime is crime committed by corporate employees or owners to financially advantage a corporation.

Corporate crime refers to crimes committed by a corporation or by individuals who may be identified with a corporation

Corporate crime may involve acts like fraud (Madoff, Enron), environmental pollution (corporate crime, such as the 1985 Union Carbide accident in Bhopal, India), making of unsafe products and dangerous work environments.

As the majority of individuals who may represent the interests of the corporation are employees or professionals of a higher social class, such corporate crimes may be referred to as white-collar crimes.

"Corporate crime poses a significant threat to the welfare of the community. Given the pervasive presence of corporations in a wide range of activities in our society, and the impact of their actions on a much wider group of people than are affected by individual action, the potential for both economic and physical harm caused by a corporation is great." - Law Reform Commission of New South Wales.

The Sociology of Corporate Crime: An Obituary (Or: Whose Knowledge Claims have Legs?)
LAUREEN SNIDER Queen's University, Ontario, Canada
Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 169-206 (2000), DOI: 10.1177/1362480600004002003
This article makes three arguments: first, that the brand of state regulation known as corporate crime has basically disappeared; second, that it has been argued into obsolescence through neoliberal knowledge claims advanced through specific discourses by powerful elites; and third, that the acceptance of these knowledge claims cannot be understood without examining their relationship to the corporate counter-revolution that has, over the last two decades, legitimized virtually every acquisitive, profit-generating act of the corporate sector, transforming the developed (and developing) world.

Insuring Corporate Crime
Miriam H. Baer, Brooklyn Law School
Abstract: Corporate criminal liability has become an important and much-talked about topic. This Article argues that entity-based liability - particularly the manner in which it is currently applied by the federal government - creates social costs in excess of its benefits. To help companies better deter employee crime, the Article suggests the abolition of entity-wide criminal liability, and in its place, the adoption of an insurance system, whereby carriers would examine corporate compliance programs, estimate the risk that a corporation's employees would commit crimes, and then charge companies for insuring those risks. The insurance would cover the entity's civil penalties associated with its employees' criminal conduct. Entities that successfully procured insurance would no longer be subject to entity-wide criminal liability. Part I begins with a discussion of corporate criminal liability and the costs that accrue from the manner in which it has been implemented by the Department of Justice. Part II examines several proposals to reform corporate criminal liability and explains why they are inadequate. Part III lays out the proposal for an insurance system in lieu of entity-based criminal liability and explains, in rough form, how corporate entities might contract for insurance, how claims might be filed and how damages might be measured. Part III also addresses a number of arguments that others might raise against the proposal.

Corporate Crime Litigation: Defense Attorneys Perspective - Schnopp, Stefan. and Russo, Brian. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC).
Abstract: The recent spate of corporate scandals, suggests the need to reconsider the potential civil application of federal racketeering laws to white-collar crime. The far-reaching and devastating effects of Global Crossing, Enron, WorldCom, and other financial debacles have arguably created a legislative climate more receptive to dealing seriously with corporate crime. It is clear that in the United States actions by Congress to create new crimes and increase penalties, efforts by prosecutors to influence courts to make it easier to achieve convictions, and the piling on of numerous proceedings by successive regulatory agencies provides the government with additional methods for attacking and punishing corporate crime, the defense bar has new challenges ahead . This presentation addresses the defense bar's perspective on conducting corporate crime litigation.

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION
Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 03-04
Abstract: Corporate crime has once again become an important issue on the U.S. legislative agenda leading Congress and the various regulatory bodies to tighten the law and enhance honesty and completeness in disclosure. However, the continued and rather explosive growth of corporate crime legislation leaves one with a rather strange puzzle: how can such a state of the world arise? After all, corporations and business interests are considered some of the most, if not the most, powerful and effective lobbyists in the country. Yet, we witness the continued expansion of legislation that criminalizes their behavior (one estimate suggests over 300,000 federal regulatory offenses that can be prosecuted criminally). How could this have happened? This paper sets out to answer this puzzle.
An answer is important not only for understanding the political dynamics of current regulation, but also because it provides insights into the effectiveness of our current approach for regulating corporate wrongdoing. Overall, my analysis suggests that most corporate crime legislation arises at times when there is a large public outcry over a series of corporate scandals during or around a downturn in the economy. In such a situation Congress must respond and corporate crime legislation may be the preferred response for some corporate interests. This is because it satisfies the public outcry while imposing relatively low costs on corporate interests, avoiding legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to their interests, and sometimes helping to deflect criminal liability away from managers and executives and on to corporations. This explains not only the impressive growth of corporate crime legislation, but also leads to some surprising normative conclusions. In particular, it leads to the counter-intuitive result that if one starts with the view that there is under-deterrence of corporate wrongdoing then one would probably prefer to reduce corporate criminal liability and focus more on corporate civil liability and managerial liability.

Factors Stimulating Corporate Crime
Voon, Sze-Ling, Puah, Chin-Hong, Entebang, Harry, Chin-Hong Puah
Abstract: Building on the perception of both existing and potential investors in Kuching, Sarawak, this study aims to identify the factors that appear to stimulate corporate crime activity in organizations. A survey was carried out by distributing questionnaires to both types of investors selected on randomly basis. The findings reveal that corporate crime activities are mostly due to inadequate cash security practices, inadequate supervision as well as a lack of internal auditing. To minimize the effects of corporate crime on investors and organizations, managers should pay extra attention to these factors. On the other hand, future research within the context of corporate crime may consider the extent to which organizational crime can affect the shareholder value creation of organizations.

Targeting Employees for Corporate Crime and Forbidding Their Indemnification
Wallace P. Mullin, George Washington University - Department of Economics
Christopher M. Snyder, Dartmouth College
Abstract: The literature on corporate crime has focused on crimes committed by employees who are not necessarily acting in the interest of the firm. In this setting it is clear employees should be sanctioned; the question is whether the firm should be as well. The recent wave of corporate scandals has a different character: in many of these cases, the crime serves firm owners' direct interest; employees commit crimes only in response to incentives provided by the firm. In this latter setting it is clear the firm should be sanctioned; the question is whether employees should be as well. We show sanctioning employees solves a number of enforcement problems---increasing deterrence in the presence of a judgment-proof firm; reducing the chance that type-I enforcement errors lead to the bankruptcy of innocent firms by provide the same level of deterrence with lower overall fines. We show that forbidding indemnification is usually inefficient. The one case we find it to be useful is to encourage the employee's cooperation with prosecutors to increase the probability of successful prosecution of the firm.

Police Departments as Victims of State-Corporate Crime - Reifert, Steve. and Carlson, Susan. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY, Atlanta Marriott Marquis, Atlanta, Georgia
Abstract: Literature on state/state-corporate crime victimization focuses on citizens, workers, and other private individuals or groups of individuals who experience harm as a result of these crimes (Kauzlarich, Matthews, and Miller 2001). Neglected in this literature is an appreciation for victimization of state entities by corporate actions, and facilitation or initiation by other parts of the state. This study makes a contribution to the state/state-corporate crime victimology literature by examining a case study of state-corporate crime at the local government level where a public safety department was a victim of corporate malfeasance facilitated by agencies within the federal government, and the professional organizations they fund. The paper concludes with implications for development of state/state-corporate crime victimology.

Re-Imagining Crime Prevention: Controlling Corporate Crime?
Anne Alvesalo ; Steve Tombs ; Erja Virta ; Dave Whyte
Journal: Crime, Law and Social Change Volume:45 Issue:1 Dated:2006
Annotation: After considering how current crime-prevention theory and practice can be applied to corporate crime, this article examines recent developments in the implementation of corporate-crime prevention in Finland.
Abstract: Noting that "situational crime prevention" has dominated the theory and practice of crime prevention in contemporary liberal democracies, the authors discuss the application of routine activities theory--the conceptual foundation for situational crime prevention--to corporate crime. Routine activities theory focuses on three features of a crime: a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. The authors discuss how corporate crime can be addressed under these features of situational crime prevention. This is followed by an overview of the events that led the Finnish Government to take action against economic crime in 1996. Laws were reformed or newly enacted to counter securities crime, money laundering, tax evasion, and various types of fraud. Also, the organization of police investigations of economic crime has been reformed, and the number of investigators has increased significantly. Perhaps the most significant trend, however, is a change in the national mindset, both by the public and politicians, in viewing corporate crime as "real" crime. Based on current crime prevention theory and the effectiveness of Finland's actions to prevent economic crime, the authors offer three recommendations. First, reorient crime prevention partnerships to include regulatory agencies, work organizations, consumer groups, and environmental pressure groups. Second, develop new forms of surveillance from the grassroots, since the involvement of workers, social movements, and other organized interests can be "capable guardians" against corporate crime. Third, available data on corporate crime should be publicized as widely as possible by local crime prevention agents as a means of raising awareness of the risks of victimization and rallying public support for the control of corporate crime.

Cooperative Models and Corporate Crime: Panacea or Cop-Out?
Laureen Snider
Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 36, No. 3, 373-390 (1990), DOI: 10.1177/0011128790036003005
This article critiques the new "cooperative" models of regulatory reform, arguing that they will weaken the process of regulation. After documenting some of the problems of criminalization models, the article describes the major cooperative schemes that have been offered. The roots of their current popularity are examined and traced to the fiscal and ideological crises that beset capitalist economies in the 1980s. The consequences of adopting a cooperative model are set out. Last, the unlikely prospects for achieving more effective enforcement by cooperative regulation are discussed.

Corporate crime in Australia
Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite
ISBN 0 642 11867 1 ; ISSN 0817-8542
Abstract
The authors define corporate crime and outline ten major areas of corporate conduct which may breach the law: companies and securities offences; taxation; occupational health and safety; environmental offences; consumer affairs; restrictive trade practices; food standards; prudential regulation; economic offences against employees; and discriminatory practices. Other topics covered include the inadequacy of statistics on corporate crime; the varieties of governmental response; and key issues in corporate crime control.

New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime
Alexander, C.R., Cohen, M.A., Mark A. Cohen
Abstract
The intuition tat poorly performing corporations are more likely to engage in crime is found through-out the contemporary literature on the economics of corporate misconduct. Yet little evidence of such a relationship exists. This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between prior performance and corporate crime using panel data on public corporations, 1975-92.

Corporate Crime and Restitution.
Abel, Charles F.
Journal of Offender Counseling, Services, & Rehabilitation, v9 n3 p71-94 Spr 1985
Abstract:
Articulates need, nature, and form of a restitutionary approach to corporate crime. Considers small, in-prison production-oriented programs; residential in-community programs, and nonresidential in-community programs for individual offenders; also considers lump sum and continuous payments for corporations to make restitution. (NRB)

The Changing Atmospherics of Corporate Crime Sentencing in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act Era
Peter J. Henning
Wayne State University Law School; Wayne State University Law School
Wayne State University Law School Research Paper No. 08-09
Journal of Business and Technology Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 18, 2008
Abstract:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been viewed as a watershed event in dealing with corporate fraud. In addition to its extensive provisions dealing with internal controls and corporate accounting procedures, the law adopted new crimes and pushed the United States Sentencing Commission to enhance the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provisions for fraud and related offenses. Even before the adoption of the Act, the Commission had increased the potential punishment for white collar crimes by amending the loss table for fraud offenses. These two steps played a key role in the increased sentences imposed on defendants convicted for their role in corporate crimes, such as Bernie Ebbers (twenty-five years) and John Rigas (fifteen years). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act marked a change in the sentencing atmospherics for corporate crime that propelled judges to give out sentences that were unthinkable even five years earlier.
This article considers how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed the approach to sentencing of white collar defendants involved in corporate crimes. It uses a hypothetical case to illustrate how sentences under the Guidelines have tripled from what they would have been just a few years earlier. It then looks at the recent Supreme Court decision in Gall v. United States that emphasized the discretion federal judges have even under the Sentencing Guidelines to shape sentences that reflect the individual circumstances of the defendant. The change in sentencing created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may well be abating in the new era of discretion fostered by the Supreme Court.

Subsidizing Corporate Crime and Rewarding Constitutional Abuses - huffingtonpost.com

CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTS, CORPORATE CRIME, AND DETERRENCE (FROM CRIME, LAW, AND SANCTIONS - THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, 1978, BY MARVIN KROHN AND RONALD AKERS SEE NCJ-52482)
P LAUDERDALE ; H GRASMICK ; J P CLARK
Corporate Author: Sage Publications, Inc
Annotation: THIS PAPER IS CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL THREATS ON THE AMOUNT AND DEFINITION OF WHITE COLLAR OR CORPORATE CRIME.
Abstract: TWO APPROACHES CENTRAL TO THE STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME ARE: (1) IDENTIFYING TYPES OF ACTIVITIES THAT FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF WHITE COLLAR OR CORPORATE CRIME, EMPHASIZING HOW ACTORS ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES AND THE USE OF LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY AGENCIES TO CONTROL OFFENSES (SOCIAL CONTROL APPROACH); AND (2) IDENTIFYING TYPES OF ACTIVITIES THAT FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF WHITE COLLAR OR CORPORATE CRIME, FOCUSING ON WHY ACTORS ARE MOTIVATED TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPING BROADER THEORIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL APPROACH). THE SOCIAL CONTROL APPROACH DEALS WITH WHEN OFFENSES ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE OBSERVED AND PROSECUTED. THE SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL APPROACH, ALTHOUGH CONCERNED WITH SIMILAR OFFENSES, PRIMARILY FOCUSES UPON WHY PEOPLE ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES AND THE IMPACT OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME ON LARGER INSTITUTIONAL ARENAS. EXTERNAL THREATS TO CORPORATE SOCIAL SYSTEMS ARE ANALYTICALLY CATEGORIZED AS POWER REALIGNMENT, ACTIONS OF REGULATORY AGENCIES AND PROSECUTORIAL ACTORS, AMPLIFICATION OF RESOURCE INSTABILITY OR DEPLETION, AND NEW OR INCREASED COMPETITION. CHANGES IN EXTERNAL THREATS INFLUENCE THE AMOUNT OF CORPORATE CRIME VIA THREE IMPORTANT PROCESSES: (1) BY CHANGING THE DEFINITION OF WHAT IS CONSIDERED A CRIME THROUGH THE CREATION OR REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL LAW; (2) BY CHANGING THE RATE AT WHICH CRIMINAL ACTIONS ARE DETECTED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AND (3) BY CHANGING THE ACTIONS OF ACTORS WITHIN THE CORPORATE SYSTEM. THREE HYPOTHESES ARE PROPOSED THAT RELATE TO EXTERNAL THREATS IN CORPORATE CRIME. FIRST, FLUCTUATION IN CORPORATE CRIME RATES IS A REFLECTION OF CHANGES IN CONSTRAINTS (THREATS) INDIGENOUS TO CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTS RATHER THAN CHANGES IN CORPORATE ACTIONS PER SE. SECOND, THERE ARE ONLY WEAK RELATIONSHIPS AMONG EXTERNAL THREATS THAT PRODUCE CHANGES IN CORPORATE CRIME RATES. THIRD, EXTERNAL THREATS NOT ONLY PRODUCE REINTERPRETATIONS OF ONGOING CORPORATE ACTIONS BUT ALSO STIMULATE REACTIONS BY CORPORATE ACTORS THAT INCREASE THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN CORPORATE CRIME. A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF FLUCTUATIONS IN CORPORATE CRIME IN RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL THREATS ARE INCLUDED. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED.

The price of corporate crime: the risks to business
John Sliter
Journal: Journal of Financial Crime
Law enforcement officers around the globe are being pushed to deliver and, with an increase in public resources, are pursuing corporate criminals with renewed enthusiasm. Shareholders have started choosing their investments based on social responsibility and ethical leadership. Western countries are experiencing the end of the baby boom and employees will soon be in big demand and able to pick where they want to work, thereby reasonably expecting to choose only the most socially responsible companies. This will not include those companies involved in corporate crime! It is asserted that the future does indeed look tougher for those employees, executives or companies who may get involved in corporate crime.

Retribution and Corporate CrimeKam C. Wong, Xavier University
Abstract
This paper explores the issue of whether the retribution theory can be applied as a justification for or as an assessment of corporate criminal punishment.
The fact that the white-collar criminals are being treated more leniently is no longer in doubt. The only question is whether the disparity in treatment is justified or more to the point whether it is fair? Issues of fairness in punishment are properly the concerns of retributionists. Ultimately, the question that needs to be answer is: on account of our understanding of the retribution theory what punishment properly fits corporate crimes and criminals? More generally, does retribution theory help us in setting punishment for the corporate criminals? This paper is devoted these issue.
The major thesis of this paper is that the retribution theory of punishment cannot be made to apply to corporate criminals without some very major revisions to its underlying premises. Particularly, this author observes that there are conceptual as well as practical problems in applying the retribution theory to the corporate context.

Disappearing act: The representation of corporate crime research in criminological literature
Michael J. Lynch, Danielle McGurrinb and Melissa Fenwicka
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Abstract
Following the labeling, conflict, and radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the attention these perspectives directed toward crimes committed by the powerful, it became commonplace for most criminologists to assume that corporate and white-collar crime received adequate attention in criminological and criminal justice literature. At the same time, corporate and white-collar crime researchers continued to assert that the behaviors they studied remain underrepresented in criminological literature, especially relative to the level of harm these behaviors cause. This article examines these two competing assumptions concerning the prevalence of corporate and white-collar crime literature during the later 1990s by: (1) analyzing the contents of several major criminological and criminal justice journals over a five-year time period; and (2) analyzing the coverage, placement, and integration of white-collar and corporate crime discussions in criminology and criminal justice textbooks. In addition, twenty-one Ph.D. granting criminology departments were polled to determine whether they offered regular and required courses on corporate and white-collar crime. Representativeness was determined through comparisons of the number of journal articles and the number of textbook pages published on white-collar and corporate crime indicators relative to the number of articles and pages published on several other criminological issues. Indicators of and the determination of representativeness are related to indicators of the seriousness (financial costs and level of violence) and impact of corporate and white-collar crime on society compared to the seriousness and impact of street crimes.

Does the Difference Between "Corporate interest" and "Personal interest" in Corporate Crime Influence Sentencing?
Econometric Analysis of Sentencing Factors in the Corporate Tax Evasion
Ken Shiraishi
(Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office)
Sayuri Shiraishi
(Yokohama City University)
Atsushi Yamashita
(Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office)
Takaaki Murakami
(Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office)
Abstract
Based on the fact that corporate crime has two types of motives - "corporate interest" and "personal interest" - court decisions often suggest that the type of motive a defendant had may affect sentencing. This paper verifies such an effect on corporate tax evasion cases by utilizing econometric analysis. We found that "corporate interest" has a negative effect on sentencing. We think that the result is reasonable from a social standpoint but is not justifiable from a standpoint of crime deterrent. Therefore, we argue that we should rethink criminal liability and crime deterrents in sentencing theory in cases of corporate crime.
Moreover, when the jury system is introduced in 2009, we expect econometric analysis to play a significant role in sentencing, which will contribute enhanced transparency in criminal justice procedures and in sentencing.

The Role of Organizational Structure in the Control of Corporate Crime and Terrorism
Book The Criminology of White-Collar Crime
Publisher Springer New York
DOI 10.1007/978-0-387-09502-8
Laura Dugan and Carole Gibbs
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
Abstract
In this chapter, we draw direct comparisons between corporate crime and terrorism in order to improve our understanding on how to better control each. We acknowledge obvious differences between the corporate criminal and the terrorist organization, but also raise important similarities between them. Namely, corporations and terrorist organizations both strive to survive in highly competitive environments and have adopted more complex organizational structures over time to achieve this goal. However, it is this organizational complexity thatmakes it difficult for criminal justice officials to detect and prosecute illicit behavior. After drawing upon the literature in both areas to describe organizational complexity, we offer several (surprisingly similar) recommendations to better control the corporate criminal and the terrorist organization.

State-Corporate Crime and the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Alan S. Bruce, Quinnipiac University
Paul J. Becker, University of Dayton
Western Criminology Review 8(2), 29–43 (2007)
Abstract: While criminologists have for some time examined state and corporate crime as separate entities, the concept of state-corporate crime highlighting joint government and private corporate action causing criminal harm is a recent area of study with relatively few published case studies (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000). This paper focuses on state-corporate crime at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, Kentucky, and contributes to the study of state-corporate crime in three ways: (1) it adds a new case study to a field in which there are few published accounts, (2) it assesses the utility of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theoretical framework of state-corporate crime by applying it to understanding harms at PGDP, and (3) it demonstrates how the state role in state-corporate crime can evolve from that of instigator to facilitator. PGDP is an especially important case study in the field of state-corporate crime because it constitutes a rare instance in which the federal government has both acknowledged and apologized for its role in harms caused to plant workers and the environment.

Public Support for Getting Tough on Corporate Crime
Racial and Political Divides
James D. Unnever, University of South Florida-Sarasota
Michael L. Benson, University of Cincinnati, OH
Francis T. Cullen, University of Cincinnati, OH
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 45, No. 2, 163-190 (2008), DOI: 10.1177/0022427807313707
The recent wave of corporate wrongdoing has raised the issue of whether the public is concerned about the control of lawlessness in the business world. Using a national probability sample, we explore whether Americans want to enact stricter regulations of the stock market and advocate more punitive criminal sanctions for corporate executives who conceal their company's true financial condition. The findings reveal that Americans generally favor getting tough on corporate illegality. The analysis also indicates, however, that group differences exist in public support for punitive corporate crime control policies. Although liberals and conservatives equally support punishing corporate criminals more harshly, African Americans are more likely than Whites to endorse more restrictive and more punitive policies toward corporate criminals. We conclude that punitive attitudes are socially constructed beliefs that reflect the dynamics of conflicted class and racial relations.

Braithwaite, John. (1984). Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Books. ISBN 0-7102-0049-8
Clinard, Marshall B. & Yeager, Peter Cleary. (2005). Corporate Crime. Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-4128-0493-0
Ermann, M. David & Lundman, Richard J. (eds.) (2002). Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society. (6th edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-513529-6
Friedrichs, David O. (2002). "Occupational crime, occupational deviance, and workplace crime: Sorting out the difference". Criminal Justice, 2, pp243-256.
Gobert, J & Punch, M. (2003). Rethinking Corporate Crime, London: Butterworths. ISBN 0-406-95006-7
Kicenski, Karyl K. (2002). The Corporate Prison: The Production of Crime & the Sale of Discipline.
Mokhiber, Russell & Weismann, Robert. (1999). Corporate Predators : The Hunt for Mega-Profits and the Attack on Democracy. Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-158-9
Pearce, Frank & Tombs, Steven. (1992). "Realism and Corporate Crime", in Issues in Realist Criminology. (R. Matthews & J. Young eds.). London: Sage.
Pearce, Frank & Tombs, Steven. (1993). "US Capital versus the Third World: Union Carbide and Bhopal" in Global Crime Connections: Dynamics and Control. (Frank Pearce & Michael Woodiwiss eds.).
Pečar, Janez (1996). "Corporate Wrongdoing Policing" College of Police and Security Studies, Slovenia.
Reed, Gary E. & Yeager, Peter Cleary. (1996). "Organizational offending and neoclassical criminology: Challenging the reach of a general theory of crime". Criminology, 34, pp357-382.
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Simpson, Sally S. (2002). Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Wells, Celia. (2001). Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-826793-2

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