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Methodological Holism
Sociologyindex, Sociology Books 2011, Methodological Individualism, Methodological Holism
Methodological holism is
an orientation in research and analysis where the aim is to understand the phenomenon
under investigation in its totality as unique and apart from its component parts, rather
than to seek to fragment it into known or familiar components.
The key idea, in essence,
is that the whole differs from the sum of the parts not only in quantity but in quality.
Methodological Holism says that the individual element is
inextricably tied to other individuals. Methodological Holism regards individuals or
elements as reciprocally influencing each other.
Methodological Holism
Malcolm Williams
Methodological Holism The opposite of methodological individualism, this doctrine holds
that social wholes are more than the sum of individual attitudes, beliefs, and actions and
that the whole can often determine the characteristics of individuals. Holism has been
prominent in philosophy and social science since Hegel, and, arguably, it has its roots in
the writings of Plato. Methodological holism (often abbreviated to holism) takes a number
of forms across social science disciplines. Although very different in their views and
emphases, Marx, Dewey, Durkheim, and Parsons can all be regarded as holists. The
quintessential holist thinker was the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1896/1952).
HOLISM, INDIVIDUALISM, REDUCTIONISM
Jacek Szmatka, International Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 169-186 (1989) DOI:
10.1177/026858089004002004
Two versions of methodological individualism and three versions of methodological holism
are critically analysed and, as a result, methodological reductionism is postulated. In
ontological respects it assumes that social reality is not a homogeneous arrangement, that
it is characterised by discontinuity of its properties, and that there exist areas in
social reality called levels, which means that this conception is decidedly holistic. In
methodological respects, methodological reductionism distinguishes explanations of the
first degree, i.e., `one-level' explanations from explanations of the second degree,
ultimate explanations, i.e., the ones in which the explanans refer to laws and statements
related to phenomena from a different level from those to which the explanandum refers.
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, INCONCEIVABILITY, AND METHODOLOGICAL HOLISM
BRANKO MITROVIC, UNITEC, Auckland, New Zealand
ABSTRACT: The debate between individualism and holism in the philosophy of history
pertains to the nature of the entities relied on in historical explanations. The question
is whether explanations of historical items (for example, events, actions, artifacts)
require the assumption that the collective historical entities (for example,
civilizations, cultures, and so on) used in these explanations are (sometimes) conceived
of as irreducible to the actions, thoughts, and beliefs of individual human beings. In
this paper I analyze two methodological problems that holist explanations face in the
writing of intellectual history. The first problem derives from the fact that holist
explanations in intellectual history have to rely on the claim that certain beliefs were
inconceivable to some individuals because they were members of specific collectives,
whereas it is unclear how historical research can justify such claims when made from the
holist position. The second problem pertains to the difficulties the holist position faces
when it has to account for the novel properties of artifacts studied by intellectual
history. - blackwell-synergy.com
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