Moral Pluralism

Sociologyindex, Pluralism, Sociology Books 2011, Moral Pluralism

Moral Pluralism is also known as ethical pluralism or value pluralism.

Moral Pluralism is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. Moral pluralism also postulates that such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance.

Moral Pluralism is an alternative to both moral relativism and moral absolutism. An example of moral pluralism is the idea that the moral life of a nun is incompatible with that of a mother, yet there is no purely rational measure of which is preferable. Hence, moral decisions often require radical preferences with no rational calculus to determine which alternative is to be selected.

Moral Pluralism and the Origin of Political Conflict
Ferrell, Jason
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association
Abstract: Political institutions have frequently been justified as a response to conflict. Consequently, assumptions about the nature of conflict often shape our conceptions of what is political. Two of the most prevalent interpretations of conflict regard it as either a contest of interest or a competition for resources. That is, conflict is often understood as resulting from an exclusive self-regard or from a situation of scarcity. In each instance, conflict is thought to entail a situation of insecurity that can only be overcome through the establishment of political institutions. While such interpretations of conflict are instructive, they nevertheless provide partial accounts of the sources of conflict. As I will argue here, there is another conception of conflict – one tied to the idea of moral pluralism – which offers a different interpretation of this idea, and therefore prompts a reconsideration of how we justify our institutions. To show this I will review arguments concerning the origin of conflict as understood by game theory’s conception of the “prisoner’s dilemma” (as seen in the work of David Gauthier) and the idea of the “tragedy of the commons.” Although much is to be gained from both these ideas, such concepts fail to account fully for the nature of all conflict. For from the perspective of pluralism, moral conflict often escapes explanation in terms of self-regard or scarcity. To appraise, accurately, the nature of such conflict, a different approach is needed. Once this has been done, one can then indicate a new justification of our institutions.

Moral Pluralism and Liberal Democracy: Isaiah Berlin's Heterodox Liberalism
William A. Galston
The Review of Politics (2009), 71:85-99 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0034670509000072
Abstract: While Isaiah Berlin considered himself principally as a political theorist in the liberal tradition, his was an unorthodox liberalism in both method and substance, rooted in the confluence of three traditions—British, Russian, and Jewish. Unlike many liberals, he wrestled with the tension between universalism and particularism, and also between individualism and communalities. He rejected all monistic approaches to morality (including liberal monism) but repudiated as well the moral relativism of much modern thought, espousing instead value pluralism. While we cannot arrive at a universally valid conception of the summum bonum, we can specify the summun malum—the great evils of the human condition. Berlin saw political theory as a branch of moral philosophy but drew political morality from political life rather than imposing it on politics. The range of goods and principles that human beings rightly prize cannot be combined into harmonious wholes in either our individual or collective existence. Some goods exclude others, and we must choose among them.

Moral Pluralism in Business Ethics Education: It is About Time
Brian K. Burton, Western Washington University
Craig P. Dunn, Western Washington University
Michael Goldsby, Ball State University
Journal of Management Education, Vol. 30, No. 1, 90-105 (2006) DOI: 10.1177/1052562905280837
The teaching of business ethics is almost inherently pluralistic, but little evidence of explicitly pluralistic approaches exists in teaching materials besides the available decision-making frameworks. In this article, it is argued that the field needs to acknowledge and adopt pluralism as the standard pedagogical approach, whether the individual teacher uses a philosophical approach or a more applied approach, to best serve students and society. Examples of teaching approaches are offered, including attempts instructors have made to teach ethics in a pluralistic manner.

Moral Pluralism and the Environment
Andrew Brennan
Abstract: Cost-benefit analysis makes the assumption that everything from consumer goods to endangered species may in principle be given a value by which its worth can be compared with that of anything else, even though the actual measurement of such value may be difficult in practice. The assumption is shown to fail, even in simple cases, and the analysis to be incapable of taking into account the transformative value of new experiences. Several kinds of value are identified, by no means all commensurable with one another Ð a situation with which both economics and contemporary ethical theory must come to terms. A radical moral pluralism is recommended as in no way incompatible with the requirements of rationality, which allows that the business of living decently involves many kinds of principles and various sorts of responsibilities. In environmental ethics, pluralism offers the hope of reconciling various rival theories, even if none of them is universally applicable.

Lawyers, Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism
Katherine R. Kruse, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV
Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, Forthcoming
Abstract: The debate over whether it serves or undermines the interests of justice for lawyers to temper the zeal of their advocacy based on considerations of morality or justice has largely been polarized between two camps: traditionalists and moralists. Traditionalists defend the amoral role of lawyers, arguing that lawyers should remain moral neutral in their representation of clients. Moralists propose alternative social justice lawyering models, which urge lawyers' morally engagement in their choice of clients, their interpretation of law, and their counseling of clients.
This article revisits the debate by recasting the question at its center. Instead of inquiring what a lawyer should do when asked to assist an immoral client, it asks what a lawyer should do when asked to assist a client with whom the lawyer fundamentally morally disagrees. By shifting the question, this article focuses attention on a subject that has been largely missing from the debate among lawyering theorists: the challenge of moral pluralism. Moral pluralism has been widely discussed in political and moral philosophy, but its implications for lawyering theory have been less fully explored. This article explores those implications by surveying what political and moral theorists say about the sources of moral pluralism, and demonstrating how those explanations lead to the creation of an internal moral perspective. The article then uses this analysis to examine the shortcomings of both the traditional model of morally neutral lawyering, and the alternative social justice lawyering models, in the face of moral pluralism. The shortcomings of each model are illustrated by applying each model to a hypothetical lawyer-client relationship in which a lesbian couple, hoping to duplicate the legal protections of marriage for the child they plan to parent together, seeks legal counsel from a lawyer who is morally opposed to homosexuality.
The better alternative, proposed in this article, is to view fundamental moral disagreements as moral conflicts of interest, subject to the same protections for clients that traditional conflicts of interest entail. Although the building blocks for a moral conflict of interest analysis are already present in professional standards, the bar has been reluctant to fully embrace the idea of moral conflicts of interest. Underlying the bar's reluctance is a concern that permitting lawyers the prerogative of moral abstention will deleteriously affect representation for politically unpopular clients. However, the existence of moral pluralism also alleviates the concern that lawyers will act in moral concert, thus eliminating the logical aspects of the last lawyer in town problem, and leaving only logistical concerns with the provision of legal counsel.

Moral pluralism in abortion.
Gardell MA
In: Abortion and the status of the fetus, edited by William B. Bondeson, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Stuart F. Spicker and Daniel H. Winship. Dordrecht, Netherlands, D. Reidel Publishing, 1984. :325-31. (Philosophy and Medicine Volume 13)
Abstract: This discussion argues that the state of moral pluralism characterizing the abortion debate reflects an acceptance of both the implications of human reason and the obligation to reflect the autonomy of competent individuals. Considering the precedence of centuries of the imposition of moral orthodoxies by force, this acceptance is no small accomplishment. To appreciate the pluralism of beliefs at stake concerning abortion, a good starting point is the observation that Fathers McCartney and Moraczewski hold distinct views about the fetus and its importance in the development of practices regarding the fetus. These 2 Catholic theologians share a methodological tradition and the religious tradition of Roman Catholicism, yet they draw divergent conclusions. McCartney holds that the human conceptus acquires personhood sometime after conception. Moraczewski believes that the human conceptus " is an existing and actual person, integrated and inner-directed to the full realization of his or her personhood" from the moment of conception. Evidence from the historico-theological rootage of Roman Catholic accounts for their differing views. What one finds is a conflict derived from differences in metaphysical viewpoints, though both agree with respect to the ontological claim that there is an immortal soul endowed by God. Here, authors who presuppose a uniformity of belief turn out to support a pluralism of convictions. In contrast, the authors who recognize the inevitability of pluralism of beliefs, come to remarkably similar conclusions. The essays in this volume by the biomedical scientists and lawyers, for example, provide a study of reflections by persons working with different methodologies who yet arrive at similar views of the task at hand with respect to abortion. For example, Professor Biggers suggests that developmental physiology provides the empirical content necessary to answer what he sees as a fundamental question of immediate concern in the abortion debate, i.e., when does life begin. He sees the answer to be one of clarification on both the ontological and normative levels of analysis. Working within a different historical and methodological tradition, Professor White observes that the law plays a crucial role in the analysis of the concept of person and its relationship to the ethical use of the fetus in biomedicine. The articles by Feen, McCartney, and Moraczewski who sketch various approaches to the control of human reproduction through abortion and infanticide, seen against the backdrop of the other articles in this volume, facilitate recognition of the historical significance of Roe v. Wade as a compromise between competing moral interests, given the recognition of new technological abilities, the pluralism of moral beliefs, and the rights of persons.

Reproductive tourism as moral pluralism in motion
Dr G Pennings, Department of Philosophy, Free University Brussels, Pleinlaan 2, lokaal 5 C 442, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium;
gpenning@vub.ac.be, Journal of Medical Ethics 2002;28:337-341; doi:10.1136/jme.28.6.337
Reproductive tourism is the travelling by candidate service recipients from one institution, jurisdiction, or country where treatment is not available to another institution, jurisdiction, or country where they can obtain the kind of medically assisted reproduction they desire. The more widespread this phenomenon, the louder the call for international measures to stop these movements.
Three possible solutions are discussed: internal moral pluralism, coerced conformity, and international harmonisation. The position is defended that allowing reproductive tourism is a form of tolerance that prevents the frontal clash between the majority who imposes its view and the minority who claim to have a moral right to some medical service. Reproductive tourism is moral pluralism realised by moving across legal borders. As such, this pragmatic solution presupposes legal diversity.

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