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SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS

Sociologyindex, Sociology Books 2011, Ethnomethodology, Mundane Reasoning, membership categorization, Conversational Analysis, Sequential Analysis

As used by ethnomethodologists sequential analysis is the same as conversation analysis.

Sequential analysis or conversation analysis is one of three central themes that are the focus of ethnomethodology, the other two being mundane reasoning and membership categorization.

Sociologists typically examine talk or conversation as a resource to learn something of people's attitudes, the ways people's lives are structured and how people differ from each other in their values and assumptions.

The ethnomethodologist, on the other hand, treats talk or conversation as a topic to learn how ordinary members of society use properties of talk (eg: its sequential properties) in order to do things with words.

A great deal of research has been done on the structure of turn taking, story telling and openings.

Conversational analysis is also known as sequential analysis. The three central themes that are the focus of ethnomethodology, are conversational analysis, mundane reasoning and membership categorization.

Sequential Analysis of Deterrrance Games with Declining Status Quo
Carlson, Lisa. and Dacey, Raymond
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association
ABSTRACT: We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender under two specific conditions. First, we examine the one-sided incomplete information game where Challenger is uncertain about Defender’s preference ordering. Second, we examine the game under the condition that the status quo is declining. Further, we examine the behavior of Challenger using a von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule as specified by expected utility theory, and a Kahneman-Tverksy decision rule as specified by prospect theory.
The model developed in this paper offers one way to formalize a prospect theory account of Challenger’s behavior in situations that involve the strategic interaction of two or more purposive actors. The model is used to analyze three basic claims, made in the international relations literature, pertaining to the importation of prospect theory into the analysis of the deterrence game. Two of those claims pertain to an actor’s behavior when the valuation of the status quo is positive and when it is negative, and the third claim pertains to Challenger’s behavior in the face of increased loss aversion.

The formal results show that many of these claims are basically true, but that conditions exist under which the claims are false. In general, the claims made in the literature need to be made more specific. We show that in addition to specifying the valuation of the status quo and the value of the probability of loss, as per the claims, a full understanding of Challenger’s behavior also requires a specification of Challenger’s valuation of the status quo vis-à-vis the valuations of other major payoffs. In doing so, we recapture many of the details relevant to the full analysis of Challenger’s behavior in the deterrence game.

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