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SPECIESISM
Sociologyindex, Sociology Books 2012
Speciesism is discrimination against or exploitation of
certain animal species by humans, based on an assumption of human superiority.
The attitude that it is naturally right and
appropriate to give priority to human interests and demands over those of all other living
creatures.
It has led to endangerment and extinction of many
animal species and to extensive environmental damage and depletion.
From Speciesism to Equality
Joan Dunayer (Speciesism
by Joan Dunayer)
animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/Morality/Speciesism/Speciesism2equality.htm
Extract: Whenever you see a parrot in a cage, goldfish in a tank, or dog on a chain,
you’re seeing speciesism. If you believe that a turtle or wasp has less right to life
and liberty than a fox or human, or you consider humans superior to other animals, you
subscribe to speciesism. If you visit aquaprisons and zoos, wear cow skin and sheep hair,
or eat flesh, eggs, or cow-milk products, you practice speciesism.
Old Speciesism
What exactly is speciesism? Psychologist Richard Ryder coined the word speciesism in
1970. Although he didn’t explicitly define the term, he indicated that speciesists
draw a sharp moral distinction between humans and all other animals. [1] Similarly to
Ryder, philosophers Peter Singer and Tom Regan define speciesism as bias against all
nonhumans. [2] That definition is too narrow. Racism isn’t restricted to bias
against all nonwhites; it encompasses bias against any number of races (for example,
against all nonwhites except for Asians, against only blacks and native Americans, or
against only Australian aborigines). Analogously, speciesism isn’t limited to bias
against all nonhumans; it includes bias against any number of animal species, such as all
animals other than great apes, all nonmammals, or all invertebrates.
What Ryder, Singer, and Regan call ‘speciesism’
actually is only one type of speciesism: the oldest and most severe form, which I call
‘old speciesism’. Old-speciesists don’t believe that any nonhumans should
receive as much moral consideration as humans or have basic legal rights, such as rights
to life and liberty. Most humans are old-speciesists.
New Speciesism
In contrast to old-speciesists, a growing number of people believe that moral and
legal rights should extend beyond our species. However, most of these people are not
egalitarian; they display a brand of speciesism that I term ‘new speciesism’.
New-speciesists favour rights for only some nonhumans, those who seem most human-like.
Believing that most humans are superior to all nonhumans, new-speciesists see animalkind
as a hierarchy with humans at the top. Typically they regard chimpanzees, dolphins, and
other select nonhuman mammals as more important than other nonhumans. They also rank
mammals above birds; birds above reptiles, amphibians, and fishes; and vertebrates above
invertebrates.
Singer exemplifies new speciesism. In his view humans of at least normal intelligence have
more value than any nonhumans.[3] Moreover, he advocates a right to life and liberty only
for humans, other great apes, and possibly other mammals, provided that they possess as
much self-awareness as a normal human beyond earliest infancy.[4] Why a normal human? Why
not a normal octopus or crow? Singer’s criterion clearly is human-centred and
human-biased: speciesist. Singer deems all nonmammals ‘replaceable’ (his
word).[5] He isn’t categorically opposed to vivisection on nonmammals.[6] Also, he
considers it morally acceptable to rear birds, fishes, and other nonmammals for slaughter
if their lives are pleasant (extremely unlikely) and they’re killed quickly and
painlessly (also extremely unlikely).[7] ‘It is not speciesist,’ he claims, to
think that the killing of several thousand humans is ‘more tragic’ than the
killing of several million chickens.[8] Of course it’s speciesist.
Nonspeciesism
Rejecting the notion of human superiority, nonspeciesists advocate basic rights for
all sentient beings. Nonspeciesists don’t want relatively few nonhumans to be
honorary humans; they want sentience to replace humanness as the basis for rights.
Animal
Revolution Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism by Richard D. Ryder - International
Society for Applied Ethology Newsletter
Buy this book for the history and the campaigning ... buy it for the psychology and the
ideas too.' --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
"A fascinating account of how animals have been regarded and treated from ancient
times to the present day ... Buy this book for the history and the campaigning ... buy it
for the psychology and the ideas too. Even if you don't agree with him, Ryder is never
less than stimulating."--International Society for Applied Ethology Newsletter
"It would be difficult to find a text that provides a more comprehensive history of
man's changing use and relationship to non-human animals. A book full of valuable
observations and insights? This book has something important to say and Richard Ryder
knows how to say it."--Freethinker (2000)
"Richard Ryder analyses such springs of human conduct as machismo, stoicism and
squeamishness. He has never been afraid to court controversy or to unleash uncomfortable
new ideas. This is a bracing book."--Times Literary Supplement
Times Literary Supplement
'This is a bracing book.' --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
When Richard Ryder coined the term 'speciesism' over two decades ago, the issue of animal
rights was very much a minority concern that had associations with crankiness. Today, the
animal rights movement is well-established across the globe and continues to gain
momentum, with animal experimentation for medical research high on the agenda and very
much in the news. This pioneering book - an historical survey of the relationship between
humans and non-humans - paved the way for these developments. Revised, updated to include
the movement's recent history and available in paperback for the first time, and now
introducing Ryder's concept of 'painism', Animal Revolution is essential reading for
anyone who cares about animals or humanity.
Dr. Richard D. Ryder is a psychologist, ethicist, historian and political campaigner. He
is also a past chairman of the RSPCA. His other books include Victims of Science: The Use
of Animals in Research, The Political Animal: The Conquest of Speciesism and Animal
Welfare and the Environment (editor). As Mellon Professor, he taught Animal Welfare at
Tulane University.
Animal Rights Versus Humanism - The Charge of Speciesism
Kenneth J. Shapiro - Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 2, 9-37
(1990) DOI: 10.1177/0022167890302002 © 1990 SAGE Publications
The present article examines a concern I have had for some time about the compatibility of
humanistic psychology with the emerging animal rights movement. Beyond working out my
position, the paper has the additional educational and, frankly, political purpose of
bringing animal rights issues to the attention of humanistic psychologists. The article
applies certain concepts of contemporary animal rights philosophy, notably
"speciesism," to both the philosophy of humanism and humanistic psychology.
While on a philosophical level, certain concepts are discussed that would likely block a
rapprochement, I feel that humanistic psychologists as individuals are likely to extend
their compassion to non-human animals. A review of philosophical humanism reveals that its
important concept of individuality excludes non-human animals. Within this conception,
animals simply are not individuals. In fact, animals are employed as a categorical foil
representing precisely the absence of reason and relative autonomy, hallmarks of
individuality. In humanistic psychology, the concept of self-actualization is open to
similar charges. A compatability and, hence a reconciliation, is suggested through a
phenomenological rendering of empathy, a second concept critical to humanistic psychology.
- jhp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/30/2/9
HUMANISM, RACISM AND SPECIESISM
Brennan A. - Source: World Views: Environment, Culture, Religion, Volume 7, Number 3,
2003.
Abstract: The advance of biological sciences in the last two hundred years seems to have
narrowed the distance between humans and animals, and scientists themselves are active in
promoting the welfare of experimental animals. Does this mean that continued use of
animals in science is inconsistent and morally condemnable as "speciesism"? The
paper argues that philosophers' accounts of "speciesism" and the assimilation of
"speciesism" to racism by Peter Singer and others are not well founded. Racism
is a complex phenomenon, and there is no clear analogy to be drawn between it and the
supposed prejudice of "speciesism". The humanist tradition established in the
Renaissance can be a source for an ethic of care for animals, and regarding humanism
simply as a bias or prejudice akin to "speciesism" (in the sense deployed by
Singer) is misleading and simplistic. - ingentaconnect.com
Humanistic Psychology and Animal Rights: Reconsidering the Boundaries of the Humanistic
Ethic
Melanie Joy, Ph.D., Ed.M. - Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 45, No. 1,
106-130 (2005) DOI: 10.1177/0022167804272628 © 2005 SAGE Publications
Speciesism, discrimination against others based on membership in a species, is an ideology
in which countless animals are sacrificed for human ends. This system may be supported by
a set of problematic psychosocial processes that are detrimental to humans and nonhumans.
Psychology, as the field that seeks to understand human motivation and helps define the
parameters of social values and normative behavior, may be in a position to challenge the
speciesist status quo. Specifically, humanistic psychology, with its emphasis on
authenticity, personal integrity, social responsibility, ethics, empathy, and democracy,
seems naturally poised to embrace a nonspeciesist, animal rights perspective. However,
virtually all psychological paradigms seem to sanction speciesism. This article explores
the speciesist underpinnings of psychological thought and suggests a new paradigm that
embraces many humanistic values with which to appreciate the role of other animals in
human psychology and ontology and to work toward a more nonviolent social order. -
jhp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/45/1/106
Against Strong Speciesism
Donald Graft - Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2), 107–118.
doi:10.1111/1468-5930.00047
Abstract: Speciesism, difference of treatment based on an appeal to species membership, is
often likened to racism and sexism, and condemned on those grounds. Some philosophers,
however, reject this argument by analogy and instead forward an argument for speciesism
based on a postulated right of species to compete for survival. This paper attacks this
strong form of speciesism by showing that the underlying concept of 'species' is
incoherent in the context of morality, and that strong speciesism has unacceptable
corollaries. - blackwell-synergy.com
Criticisms of Speciesism
Waldau, Paul - Source: The Specter of Speciesism, December 2001, pp. 40-57(18)
Abstract: Criticisms of “speciesism” by various philosophers are engaged to
provide a test for assessing limitations of the notion generally. Analogies of speciesism
to racism and sexism are evaluated. The notion of “persons” is discussed in
terms of Immanuel Kant's division of persons and things. Duty of inquiry as an obligation
of ethics, and the notion of “species loyalty” or “species bond” is
analyzed as a cultural artifact or conventionalism. - ingentaconnect.com
Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature
Onora O'Neill, Newnham College, Cambridge
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1), 211–228.
doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00043
Abstract: Kant's ethics, like others, has unavoidable anthropocentric starting points:
only humans, or other 'rational natures', can hold obligations. Seemingly this should not
make speciesist conclusions unavoidable: might not rational natures have obligations to
the non-rational? However, Kant's argument for the unconditional value of rational natures
cannot readily be extended to show that all non-human animals have unconditional value, or
rights. Nevertheless Kant's speciesism is not thoroughgoing. He does not view non-rational
animals as mere items for use. He allows for indirect duties 'with regard to' them which
afford welfare but not rights, and can allow for indirect duties 'with regard to' abstract
and dispersed aspects of nature, such as biodiversity, species and habitats. -
blackwell-synergy.com
A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism
Journal Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
Constance K. Perry, Program in Humanities and Sciences, MCP Hahnemann University, 245 N.
15th St., MS 503, Philadelphia, PA 19102-1192, USA
Abstract: Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman
animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice
based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is
misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived
from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in
order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally
better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and
would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals
instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not
necessarily speciesism. - springerlink.com/content/tt84285328r877w1/
Expanding The Moral Circle: From Racism to Speciesism
Abstract: This paper reviews the argument by Peter Singer that speciesism, the
exploitation of other species without regard for their interests, is as morally
objectionable as racism and sexism. Objections to this argument by philosophers such as
Peter Carruthers, Mary Midgley, and Cora Diamond as well as conventional wisdom about
notions of species differences are presented and critically examined. I conclude that
Alaine Locke would have supported Singer's expansion of the moral circle. -
smith.edu/philosophy/expanding_moral_circle.html
Against strong speciesism
GRAFT D - Journal of applied philosophy (J. appl. philos.) ISSN 0264-3758
Abstract: Speciesism, difference of treatment based on an appeal to species membership, is
often likened to racism and sexism, and condemned on those grounds. Some philosophers,
however, reject this argument by analogy and instead forward an argument for speciesism
based on a postulated right of species to compete for survival. This paper attacks this
strong form of speciesism by showing that the underlying concept of 'species' is
incoherent in the context of morality, and that strong speciesism has unacceptable
corollaries. - cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=2865155
Terrorism, racism, speciesism, and sustainable use of the planet - Author:
John Cairns Jr.
Abstract: The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the
US Pentagon in Washington, DC have seized our attention and undermined our sense of
security. These terrorist actions showed a contempt for other persons and their beliefs
and practices. They are extreme demonstrations of a feeling of superiority which ignores
the inherent worth of life by killing or wounding some and depriving others of resources
that improve their quality of life. In this respect, terrorism is similar to racism and
speciesism in that all are expressions of feelings of superiority over other life forms
and that all are incompatible with sustainable use of the planet. It is proposed that both
terrorism and racism have their genesis in speciesism. Sustainability requires a
mutualistic relationship between humans and the millions of other species that
collectively constitute the planet's ecological life support system. It further requires
enhancement and protection of natural capital, as well as the enhancement and protection
of the technological and economic life support systems that depend upon natural capital.
Both terrorism and racism endanger the fair and equitable allocation of resources and the
quality of human life of present and future generations. This is probably both the cause
and effect of resource allocations. However, to achieve sustainable use of the planet,
humans must acknowledge the inherent worth of other life forms. There is no guarantee that
abolishing terrorism, racism, and speciesism will enable human society to acheive
sustainable use of the planet; however, it is difficult to envision achieving
sustainability if they persist. - doaj.org
The Specter of Speciesism - Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals
Waldau, Paul Assistant Clinical Professor, Tufts University School of Veterinary
Medicine
Abstract: This is a study of the ways in which animals have been viewed in the Buddhist
and Christian religious traditions. The concept of speciesism is used to explore basic
questions about which animals, human or otherwise, were significant to early Buddhists and
Christians. The volume also seeks to establish a general method of assessing religious
traditions’ relationship to cultures’ and believers’ views of the living
beings outside the human species. Focusing on language choices, science and other
empirical data, ethics, and mechanisms of cultural transmission, the volume assesses the
earliest strata of, first, Buddhist tradition and then Christian tradition. Drawing on
scriptures and interpretive traditions in Christianity and Buddhism, the volume argues
that decisions about human ethical responsibilities in each religion are deeply rooted in
ancient understandings of the place of humans in the world and our relationships with
other animals. Assessing the reasoning and discourse patterns about nonhuman animals,
especially in light of new perspectives that have emerged in reliance on the patient
observation of the lives of the more complicated of nonhuman animals (elephants, dolphins,
whales, and the nonhuman great apes), the volume attempts to provide a foundation for
open-minded discussions about possible relations with life outside the human species. -
oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/ content/religion/0195145712/toc.html
The
Specter of Speciesism "This is a careful and detailed examination of Buddhist and
Christian understandings of non-human animal life, going back to the canonical sources,
and reaching the conclusion that, contrary to the opinion of many, both traditions have
been equally 'speciesist'. Dr. Waldau's persuasive arguments will have to be taken into
account by everyone concerned with this issue."-John Hick, Fellow of the Institute
for Advanced Research in Arts and Social Sciences, University of Birmingham, UK
"Paul Waldau offers us what may be the most in-depth and scholarly analysis todate on
the subject of speciesism as deeply embedded in both Christianity and Buddhism. His data
are both convincing and disturbing."-The Journal of the American Academy of
Religion
This is a study of how animals (other than humans) have been viewed in the traditions of
Buddhism and Christianity. Drawing on scriptures and interpretive religious traditions,
Waldau argues that decisions about human ethical responsibilities in both religions are
deeply rooted in ancient understandings of the place of humans in the world and our
relationships with other animals. This study offers scholars and others interested in the
bases for ethical decisions new insights into Christian and Buddhist reasoning about
animals as well as what each might have to offer to the current discussions of animal
rights and environmental ethics.
Ethics and Animals
Speaker: Peter Singer, Center for Human Values, Princeton Univ., Cosponsored by the MN
Cntr. for Philosophy of Science and Dept. of Philosophy
Abstract: Thirty years ago, in Animal Liberation, I argued for the then-novel view that we
owe nonhuman animals equal consideration of their interests, and that to give them less is
speciesism, a prejudice as objectionable as racism and sexism. I also argued that the
implications of this position are that we should cease to eat animals, and that our use of
them for research should be, at least, very drastically curtailed and controlled. After 30
years of debate about this proposal among philosophers, is there any kind of consensus
about the moral status of animals?
I shall argue that there is a substantial degree of consensus, if not complete unanimity,
that pure speciesism is ethically indefensible. There is, however, more controversy about
the moral significance of features like autonomy, rationality and self-awareness, the
boundaries of which run substantially, but not entirely, parallel to the boundaries of our
species. At the practical level, there is again widespread agreement that factory farming,
and research that involves significant animal suffering without a realistic prospect of
major benefits for humans or animals, are wrong. There is, however, no agreement on the
eating of humanely raised animals, or on less objectionable forms of research. -
physics.umn.edu/calendar/HSTC/calendar.html?item=1775
Speciesism
David Cockburn - lamp.ac.uk/philosophy/speciesism.html
Extract: In a series of publications Peter Singer has drawn our attention to the massive
amount of animal suffering for which we are responsible, and to which we are indifferent.
He articulates what he regards as one of the most fundamental moral failings in the lives
of most human beings in terms of the idea of ‘speciesism’.
‘Speciesism’, Singer writes, ‘is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour
of the interests of member of one’s own species and against those of members of other
species’. In opposition to this, Singer argues that: ‘Taken in itself …..
membership of the human species is not morally relevant.
While, of course, racism comes in many forms, and while lack of imagination may play a
central role in all of them, it is far from clear that we throw much light on the failings
in our treatment of animals by suggesting that it is rather like, for example, the
Nazi’s attitude towards Jews or the attitude of certain groups of European youths
today who physically assault members of other racial groups. My own view is that the
failings are so different in character that the linkage suggested by the use of the term
‘speciesism’ leads to a positive clouding of the important issues. One way to
make this point is to reflect on Singer’s definition of the term
‘speciesism’, which I quoted earlier. An analogue of this for ‘racism’
would be: ‘a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of
one’s own race and against those of members of other races’. I take it that
nothing remotely like this will succeed in articulating the character of the evil that we
find in the behaviour of the Nazi or neo-Nazi. Rather than developing that point, however,
I will focus on two other ways in which the charge of ‘speciesism’ is misguided.
The failures that most of us exhibit in relation to non-human creatures are not, I
believe, fundamentally different in kind, from our failures in relation to most other
human beings. Our thought about human beings with whom we do not have immediate contact is
equally marked by the forms of indifference and lack of imagination that characterise our
thought about animals. With this, our lack of concern about massive animal suffering is
not radically different in form from our lack of concern about the massive human suffering
that takes place beyond our immediate field of vision. Now if that is right, the
fundamental failings in our treatment of animals have little to do with a distinction
between our attitude towards human and non-human creatures; and so for this reason, if no
other, is not helpfully characterized as ‘speciesism’.
Suppose that that much is true: that our lack of concern about massive animal suffering is
not radically different in form from our lack of concern about massive human suffering. It
might be replied that, whether or not it is different in form, it is certainly different
in degree: that our failings in this respect towards animals are of a different order from
our analogous failings towards human beings. If that were correct, it would, perhaps,
leave some force to the charge of ‘speciesism’, for it would mean that we were
distinguishing between the weight that we give to the interests of one group – human
beings – and another – non-human creatures – on the basis of the species to
which they belong.
Singer defines ‘speciesism’ as: ‘a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour
of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of
other species’. I have suggested that it is not at all clear that many of us are
guilty of speciesism as so defined. I say this, not because I believe that Singer
exaggerates the failings in our treatment of non-human creatures, but because I believe
that he does not properly acknowledge the failings in our treatment of other human beings.
The most dramatic failings in our treatment of animals may, then, have little to do with a
contrast between our attitude towards human and non-human creatures.
Speciesism
by Joan Dunayer
Reviewer: Melanie Wilson "vegetarianbabydotcom" (USA)
Books that further the rights of nonhuman animals are vital and should be embraced. In her
book Speciesism, Joan Dunayer provides considerable information on how nonhuman animals
have been enslaved and brutally treated by our species.
In defending her definition of speciesism, which she defines as "a failure, in
attitude or practice, to accord any nonhuman being equal consideration and respect,"
Dunayer provides insightful and compelling arguments on why nonhuman animals deserve life,
freedom and other basic rights and how these rights can be obtained. When will this occur?
According to Dunayer when public opinion changes. "Many more people must recognize
and reject speciesism."
Besides providing rational, extensively documented arguments for giving animals rights,
Dunayer provides considerable, sobering information pertaining to how our species cruelly
treats and exploits other species. The following are a couple of examples.
"With regard to pigs, Iowa is a major slave state. In the preceding chapter, you read
how sows are restrained during pregnancy. The crate in which a sow gives birth and nurses
her piglets is even more confining than the pregnancy stall. Metal bars directly above the
sow restrict her to a lying position, or straps bind her to the floor. Sows and boars are
fed only once every two or three days (just enough to leave them able to reproduce), so
they're perpetually hungry. Soon after birth, piglets have their ears notched, needle
teeth clipped, and tail cut off - all without anesthetic. As previously mentioned, male
piglets also are castrated without anesthetic. Prematurely taken from their mother,
piglets are confined to cages stacked in rows. Each cage commonly imprisons eight to ten
piglets. Forced to stand on wire mesh, each piglet has less than two square feet of floor
space. At about two months of age, the pigs are crowded into pens with concrete, slatted
floors. By the time they go to slaughter, many pigs are crippled. Most have pneumonia,
from breathing ammonia produced by accumulated waste. Is it any wonder that Iowa excludes
pigs from its general cruelty statute?"
"Many goat enslavers burn away kids' horn buds with a red-hot iron. As the iron is
pressed to their head, the kids struggle and, often, scream. (Some die from shock -
further evidence of severe pain.) At slaughter, salmons are dumped into water infused with
carbon dioxide. Before they become paralyzed, they make 'vigorous attempts to escape.' Why
would fishes try to escape from water? Carbon dioxide is painful to breathe. On 'fur
farms,' foxes are electrocuted. With one electrode in their anus and another inside their
mouth or clipped to their lip, they remain conscious as the current passes through their
body. They scream before dying of cardiac arrest."
Are you guilty of speciesism? Dunayer provides an easy suggestion to find out.
"The test for speciesism is simple: If the victims were human, would you be speaking
and acting as you are? If not, don't speak and act that way when the victims are
nonhuman."
Anyone who cares about how nonhuman animals are treated will benefit from reading this
book. --Glenn Perrett
Reviewer: Evelyn B. Pluhar
Joan Dunayer, author of the excellent Animal Equality, has written another very fine and
original book. In SPECIESISM, she defends the equal moral significance of every sentient
being. In the course of doing so, she thoroughly discusses and criticizes "Old
Speciesism," "New Speciesism," and the nonhuman-animal advocacy groups who
actually espouse the notions of either of these views. Her final three chapters are
devoted to truly nonspeciesist philosophy, law, and a program for nonspeciesist advocacy.
While some of the philosophers she discusses will not agree with every criticism she
raises against their views, she is dead on target in many of her arguments. Her discussion
of much of our current law, "Old Speciesist" to the core, is a horrifyingly
detailed exposition of slave trade law. The legal "reforms" advanced by
"New Speciesists" are also exposed as bows to human superiority: the more
intelligent the nonhuman animal is; i.e., the closer to us the nonhuman is, the bigger and
cleaner the cages get to be.
One of the several great services SPECIESISM performs is Dunayer's presentation of
compelling scientific evidence for the sentience of invertebrates. There are many, many
nonhuman animals deserving of equal moral significance with human animals if Dunayer is
right. She shows too how it would actually be possible to implement these principles of
respect. She offers a realistic scenario for legal change, change that would take place
gradually, as more humans are persuaded against speciesism. SPECIESISM is a significant
contribution to the realization of a genuinely moral way of life.
Reviewer: Giselle Tolson (Los Angeles, CA) - See all my reviews
In this book, Dunayer essentially does the following:
- Defines speciesism, while refuting some others' definitions
- Identifies and descibes what she calls "old speciesism" and "new
speciesism"
- Identifies non-speciesist philosophy, gives its legal implications, and suggestions of
its advocacy
It doesn't sound too exciting, especially if you're new to animal rights. I don't see this
book as for those new to the idea, but rather people already familiar with and advocates
of animal rights.
I've read all the 'classic' animal rights philosophy books, after pretty much having
reached my own conclusions. I was surprised to read these "groundbreaking" books
and find myself more extreme than them, and ultimately considering their ideas a little
too conservative, even if radical in comparison to the social norm. This is where
Dunayer's work is different. No matter how much of an animal advocate you are, you'll find
yourself thinking *she* has perhaps gone too far, only to find that this thought is based
on what you claim to fight against: speciesism.
Dunayer lays out a clear and convincing case of not only the definition of speciesism or
that it exists, but why it is an invalid standard to base judgment. Through a few Supreme
Court examples among others, she demonstrates that our disregarding of nonhumans'
interests is not so much based in their intelligence, autonomy, or capacity to be social,
but simply the fact that they are not human. She also dismisses holding nonhuman animals
to a human standard for evaluating their moral worth - because this is simply a circle of
"human traits are superior because they are human." It all comes down to
species, not merit, not intelligence.
She gives us an alternative: judgment on the basis of sentience. She also redefines
sentience rather radically not to mean the capacity to suffer/feel pleasure but simple
consciousness, on the basis that some humans are incapable of feeling pain.
She insists that all animals not only be given consideration but equal consideration,
something that is lacking (even if it claims not to be) in essentially any other animal
rights literature. After making such a point, she projects its legal implications,
including the idea of granting personhood to all sentient animals and the implications
therof as well.
That's where I thought it had gone perhaps too far for even me. But that's because we
associate "personhood" with "humanhood" and citizenship, with things
like voting, driving, or the right to protest. But essentially, personhood is the basis of
protection under the law and having one's interests represented in court.
The only practical problem I find with her argument is nonhumans' right to property,
particularly their living space - since it makes a moral dilemma of whether to evict mice
from a house and destroy their home in order to make the area into a larger living
complex, as to take away urban sprawl. But that's it.
Ultimately, she provides advice of what constitutes non-speciesist animal rights advocacy,
not condemning trying to grant personhood to one species at a time, but rather if the
method used to do so would impede granting personhood to other species. In other words,
she's not an all-or-nothing advocate, not saying that all animals should be granted
personhood at once or not at all, but she does point out that many tactics trying to
legally elevate certain species leaves others potentially worse off than they began.
Wherever you stand on animal rights, this is a compelling, thought-provoking book. You'll
be questioning and re-evaluating your values, no matter how non-radical or radical. Even
if you don't agree with her conclusions, you'll be wondering how arbitrary your standards
are.
I find Dunayer's work to finally be a complete treatment of animal rights. It addresses
speciesism from blatant to subtle, the practicality of certain kinds of advocacy, and the
danger of creating a new form of speciesism by trying to advance (certain) animals'
rights. She rationally explains why rights advocates should not support
"welfarist" campaigns and addresses other issues pertinent to helping current
advocates further eliminating speciesism from their thoughts and practice.
Reviewer: Michael D. Prejean II (Denver, CO) - See all my reviews
With poignant clarity Dunayer illustrates how speciesist ideology permeates what was once
thought of as the animal rights movement. Defining speciesism as "a failure, in
attitude or practice, to accord any nonhuman being equal consideration and respect",
Dunayer exposes the underlying speciesist premises of many current animal welfare
campaigns masquerading as real animal rights. "Animal Equality", Dunayer's first
book, establishes her as the spokesperson for the abolitionist animal rights movement. She
solidifies this position in "Speceisism".
If you truly believe you are Animal Rights; If you are unsure of your position on animal
rights vs. animal welfare; If you are not sure if you really understand the difference, or
even sure of the real meaning of speciesism, I urge you to read this book, as IMNERHO, it
is nearly as an important work to the animal rights movement as "Animal
Equality" itself.
Resisting speciesism and expanding the community of equals.
Bekoff M - BIOSCIENCE 48(8): 638-641, 1998.
The Social Construction of Human Beings and Other Animals in Human-Nonhuman Relations.
Welfarism and Rights: A Contemporary Sociological Analysis. -
roger.rbgi.net/abstract%20contents.html
The Social Construction of Human Beings and Other Animals investigates dominant
socially-sedimented attitudes toward human-nonhuman relations. It seeks to examine routine
practices that flow from such social constructions. Human attitudes toward other animals
are socially constructed, institutionalised, widely internalised, and culturally
transmitted across generations. Essentially, the thesis explores many elements of the
social transmission of ‘speciesism’. It is about how and why modern human
societies exploit and harm other animals.
Annually, billions of nonhuman animals are deliberately bred and eaten by human beings;
experimented upon in biomedical and commercial laboratories; used as items of clothing;
hunted; and utilised in various forms of human entertainment, such as circuses and rodeos.
The moral and ethical attitudes that justify such treatment are predicated on centuries of
philosophical, theological and social thought and practice. The thesis investigates how
social attitudes constrain and shape thinking about other animals. Their status as
‘sentient property’, codified into law in ‘developed’ nations, is
reflected and articulated within the powerful institution of animal welfarism. It further
investigates the ‘reception’ and impact of a recently emergent ‘second
wave’ animal advocacy that challenges orthodox views about humans and other animals.
Morally, nonhumans are regarded as a great deal less important and valuable than all human
beings, regardless of their respective capacities and interests of individuals concerned.
This ‘lesser-than’ status has a devastating consequence that may serve to
seriously harm the interests of human beings as well as (more obviously) nonhuman ones.
This thesis seeks to demonstrate how ‘dehumanisation processes’ rely on a low
moral regard for nonhuman life, expressed in acts of war, genocide, relations of gender
and ‘race’, the commercial production of pornography, and other situations of
human and nonhuman harm. Within an examination of the construction of the ‘species
barrier’ and protective ‘rights’, the project also sets out to critically
question whether the basic rights of many nonhuman animals can continue to be denied with
any moral justification. It suggests that sociological analysis brings to issues vital
understandings of the socially-constructed nature of much of what is regarded as the
‘just is’ of human-nonhuman relations; and points to its continuing usefulness
in examining how societies may react to new moral ideas, often within complex systems of
knowledge denial and evasion.
Contents.
i. Introduction – p. 11.
- 21. Animal Welfarism -
- 28. Audience -
ii. Theoretical Grounding and Methodology – p. 30.
- 30. Sociology. ‘The Crisis Arrived’, or ‘After the Crisis’? –
- 35. But…Can it be Critical and Valid? -
- 45. Social Constructionism -
- 49. Construction Sites -
- 53. Claims-Making -
- 54. Methodology -
- 58. Language Use -
iii. ‘Nature’ and Nonhumans and the Sociological Imagination – p. 60.
- 60. Sociological Speciesism: The Invisibility of Nonhuman Animals -
PART ONE.
iv. Understanding the Social Construction of Boundaries – p. 73.
v. ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Categories – p. 75.
- 79. Processes of Socialisation -
- 81. Insiders and Outsiders -
- 87. The Exercise of Exclusion: Moral Closure -
- 89. Humour -
- 93. Human Beings and Animals as Utterly Distinct Categories -
vi. The Species Barrier - Introduction – p. 97.
- 98. Species as a Social Construction –
- 108. Elstein’s ‘Moral Species Concept’ -
- 111. Persons and Things -
- 122. Moral Theory: Finished Product, or Refusal to Jump the Remaining Fence(s)? -
- 128. Absolute and Relative Dismissers -
vii. Human Supremacy:
Constructing the ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong’ Sides of The Species Barrier
– p. 134.
- 134. Humans Atop the Scala Naturae -
- 137. Start with God -
- 142. Agri-Culture -
- 144. Philosophy -
- 149. Humanity’s Renewed Licence to Kill -
viii. Dehumanisation: ‘Using’ The Species Barrier – p. 154.
- 159. The Universe of Obligation -
- 161. Process -
- 165. Impersonal Killing -
- 168. The Dehumanising Effect in War -
- 170. The Meatgrinder -
- 175. Pornography -
- 183. In the Sexist Playground -
ix. The Species Barrier - ‘Maintenance’ – p. 186.
- 190. Growing Up as Animal-Harming Animal Lovers -
- 207. Socialised Lessons About Other Animals: Welfarism All the Way -
- 208. ‘Baa Baa Lambs, Talking Cows and Wise Old Bears’ -
- 210. Television, Books & Games -
- 218. Keeping the “moo” or “cluck” or “baa” away from the
meat -
- 223. Getting ‘em While They’re Young -
- 228. Keeping ‘em When They’re Older.
- 237. Rituals of Dominionism -
- 239. Dominionism and Agri-Culture -
- 241. Bullfighting -
- 243. Rodeos -
- 245. Hunting -
- 256. Talking Turkey -
- 259. Hunting in Britain -
- 265. Gibbet Lines -
- 265. So... ‘Hunter-Gatherer’ or ‘Forager’? -
- 269. Circus, Circus: Mastery Over the Wild World -
- 272. Petting -
- 275. Misothery, Pornography and Making a Few Links
PART TWO.
x. The Emergence of Animal Rights into ‘the Social’ – p. 285.
xi. Singer’s Utilitarianism or ‘New Welfarism’, Regan’s and
Francione’s Animal Rights Theories, and the Philosophical Inconsistencies in the
Contemporary ‘Animal Rights Movement’ – p. 290.
- 292. The Controversial Claim of ‘New Welfarism’ –
- 299. ‘Rights’ and ‘Animal Rights’ -
- 309. Explaining Genuine Animal Rights is Not Animal Welfare
Old Speciesism and New Speciesism
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