Terrorist Ideology And Religious Perception

Books on Sociology of Terrorism, Terrorist Groups, Abstracts, Syllabus, Bibliography, Journals, Sites, Sociology of Terrorism

Martha Crenshaw observed, "The actions of terrorist organizations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality." The variables from which their belief systems are formed include their political and social environments, cultural traditions, and the internal dynamics of their clandestine groups. Their convictions may seem irrational or delusional to society in general, but the terrorists may nevertheless act rationally in their commitment to acting on their convictions.

Terrorists view the world within the narrow lens of their own ideology, whether it be Marxism-Leninism, anarchism, nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, or some other ideology. Most researchers agree that terrorists generally do not regard themselves as terrorists but rather as soldiers, liberators, martyrs, and legitimate fighters for noble social causes. Those terrorists who recognize that their actions are terroristic are so committed to their cause that they do not really care how they are viewed in the outside world. Others may be just as committed, but loathe to be identified as terrorists as opposed to freedom fighters or national liberators.

Kristen Renwick Monroe and Lina Haddad Kreidie have found perspective - the idea that we all have a view of the world, a view of ourselves, a view of others, and a view of ourselves in relation to others - to be a very useful tool in understanding fundamentalism, for example. Their underlying hypothesis is that the perspectives of fundamentalists resemble one another and that they differ in significant and consistent ways from the perspectives of nonfundamentalists. Monroe and Kreidie conclude that "fundamentalists see themselves not as individuals but rather as symbols of Islam." They argue that it is a mistake for Western policymakers to treat Islamic fundamentalists as rational actors and dismiss them as irrational when they do not act as predicted by traditional cost/benefit models. "Islamic fundamentalism should not be dealt with simply as another set of political values that can be compromised or negotiated, or even as a system of beliefs or ideology, such as socialism or communism, in which traditional liberal democratic modes of political discourse and interaction are recognized." They point out that "Islamic fundamentalism taps into a quite different political consciousness, one in which religious identity sets and determines the range of options open to the fundamentalist. It extends to all areas of life and respects no separation between the private and the political."

Existing works that attempt to explain religious fundamentalism often rely on modernization theory and point to a crisis of identity, explaining religious fundamentalism as an antidote to the dislocations resulting from rapid change, or modernization. Islamic fundamentalism in particular is often explained as a defense against threats posed by modernization to a religious group's traditional identity. Rejecting the idea of fundamentalism as pathology, rational choice theorists point to unequal socioeconomic development as the basic reason for the discontent and alienation these individuals experience. Caught between an Islamic culture that provides moral values and spiritual satisfaction and a modernizing Western culture that provides access to material improvement, many Muslims find an answer to resulting anxiety, alienation, and disorientation through an absolute dedication to an Islamic way of life. Accordingly, the Islamic fundamentalist is commonly depicted as an acutely alienated individual, with dogmatic and rigid beliefs and an inferiority complex, and as idealistic and devoted to an austere lifestyle filled with struggle and sacrifice.

In the 1990s, however, empirical studies of Islamic groups have questioned this view. V. J. Hoffman-Ladd, for example, suggests that fundamentalists are not necessarily ignorant and downtrodden, according to the stereotype, but frequently students and university graduates in the physical sciences, although often students with rural or traditionally religious backgrounds. In his view, fundamentalism is more of a revolt of young people caught between a traditional past and a secular Western education. R. Euben and Bernard Lewis argue separately that there is a cognitive collision between Western and fundamentalist worldviews. Focusing on Sunni fundamentalists, Euben argues that their goals are perceived not as self-interests but rather as moral imperatives, and that their worldviews differ in critical ways from Western worldviews.

By having moral imperatives as their goals, the fundamentalist groups perceive the world through the distorting lens of their religious beliefs. Although the perceptions of the secular Arab terrorist groups are not so clouded by religious beliefs, these groups have their own ideological imperatives that distort their ability to see the world with a reasonable amount of objectivity.
As a result, their perception of the world is as distorted as that of the fundamentalists. Consequently, the secular groups are just as likely to misjudge political, economic, and social realities as are the fundamentalist groups. For example, Harold M. Cubert argues that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), guided by Marxist economic ideology, has misjudged the reasons for popular hostility in the Middle East against the West, "for such hostility, where it exists, is generally in response to the threat which Western culture is said to pose to Islamic values in the region rather than the alleged economic exploitation of the region's inhabitants." This trend has made the PFLP's appeals for class warfare irrelevant, whereas calls by Islamist groups for preserving the region's cultural and religious identity have been well received, at least among the nonsecular sectors of the population.

Terrorism has always seemed to have some form of political backing. Many countries have signed bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements, but extradition for political offenses is often explicitly excluded.

This makes it impossible to extradite individuals wanted for terrorist activities. Many countries like Pakistan, France and even U.S. have refrained from extraditing terrorists, adducing political motives. In June 1988, a Brooklyn judge rejected the plea of a federal prosecutor requesting the extradition of Abed El Atta (an American citizen suspected of participating in an attack against a bus in the West Bank in April 1986, in which four people were killed). The judge stated that this attack was a “political act,” part of the uprising in the occupied territories, and instrumental in the attainment of the PLO’s “political aims.” “In the West Bank, today’s rebels could be tomorrow’s rulers.” According to the judge, this is a “political charge,” excluded from the category of crimes included in the extradition treaty between Israel and the United States.

Cliché like, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” make it all the more difficult to define terrorism. The implications of defining the term terrorism tend to transcend the boundaries of theoretical discussions.

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